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Examining the Record: Understanding the Clean 
Water Act’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity in Its 
Historical Context 
Patrick A. Doyle 
Hence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the king,
even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over
him. For all jurisdiction implies superiority of power: authority to
try would be vain and idle, without an authority to redress . . . if
any person has, in point of property, a just demand upon the king,
he must petition him in his court of chancery, where his chancellor
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1. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *242–43. Blackstone provides
the basic English doctrine of sovereign immunity that the United States adopted into
its law. As shown by the above excerpt, English doctrine also provided a means for
a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. English subjects could petition the king for
relief, which the king could at his discretion as a matter of “grace.” Id.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) of 1972 to, “restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters.”2 The Act expressly waived sovereign immunity,
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-500, § 313, 86 Stat. 816, 875 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1323
(2018)).
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32021] EXAMINING THE RECORD
requiring all agencies and departments of the federal government to adhere
to its standards.3 This Article discusses the scope of the waiver of
sovereign immunity in Section 313 of the CWA. The scope of the waiver
matters because plaintiffs continue to pursue CWA actions against the
federal government in courts throughout the United States.4 The current
version of Section 313 may allow for inconsistent interpretations because
it uses the plain term “water” as opposed to the more descriptive legal term
“navigable water” used elsewhere in the CWA.5 This language allows
interested parties to dispute whether the waiver of sovereign immunity
applies to all water, including groundwater, or is limited to navigable
water. The best reading of the word “water” is clear when viewed in a
larger context. The CWA’s purpose, legislative history, and historical
context, when read with well-settled United States Supreme Court
precedent, make clear Congress intended to limit its waiver of sovereign
immunity to navigable waters rather than expand the scope of the waiver
to include waters that are not even within the jurisdictional reach of the
CWA.
The analysis in this Article begins in Section I by examining the text
of Section 313 and the jurisdictional reach of the CWA. Next, in Section
II, this Article discusses the Supreme Court’s practice of narrowly
interpreting waivers of sovereign immunity in environmental law statutes
in favor of the federal government. Then, Section III of this Article
examines the historical context in which Congress passed the CWA and
explains how that context combined with the CWA’s legislative history
make clear the drafters never contemplated the scope of the waiver
extending beyond navigable waters.
3. Id.
4. See generally Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 881 F.3d 754 (2018),
amended, 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir.), vacated, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). The
Department of Defense is especially vulnerable to water law actions as public 
interest continues to grow in the issue of Perfluorooctane Sulfonate (PFOS) and
Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA) pollution surrounding many current and former
military bases. Miranda Paley, DOD Moving Forward with Task Force to Address
PFAS, DEFENSE.GOV (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.defense.gov/explore/story/
Article/1930618/dod-moving-forward-with-task-force-to-address-pfas/ [https://
perma.cc/5P8M-LZUT].
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2018). Congress did not include the word “water”
in Section 313 of the 1972 CWA but later added it to the 1977 amendments. Clean
Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, §61, 91 Stat. 1566, 1598 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (2018)). This paper focuses on the original 1972
statute and argues its drafters in Congress clearly never would have read the scope 
of the waiver of sovereign immunity to extend beyond navigable waters.
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  8 2/25/21  8:40 AM




    
 
  
    
  
   
   
 
   







    
  
    
   
  
   
 
   
   
   
    
   
    




   
     




    
4 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S SECTION 313 WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY 
The current text of section 313 of the CWA contains an express waiver
of federal sovereign immunity.6 The text of the waiver states:
Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1)
having jurisdiction over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in
any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge or
runoff of pollutants, and each officer, agent, or employee thereof
in the performance of his official duties, shall be subject to, and
comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,
administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the
control and abatement of water pollution in the same manner, and
to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity including the
payment of reasonable service charges.7 
The problem with the language of the waiver, and the source of debate, is
that the original and current CWA fail to define the term “water.”8 The
CWA defines “navigable waters,” but not “water.”9 Section 502(7) of the
CWA defines navigable waters as “waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas.”10 The United States Army Corps of Engineers
(“USACE”) periodically issues regulations defining the scope of the legal
phrase “waters of the United States” (“WOTUS”).11 The phrase is also
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2018).
7. Id.
8. Clean Water Act § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2018).
9. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
10. Id.
11. Definition of Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 (2019). The
Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA) of 1899 first tasked the US Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) with regulating the United States’ navigable waters.
Specifically, Section 10 of the RHA stated, “That the creation of any obstruction
not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any the
waters of the United States is hereby prohibited . . . except on plans recommended
by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of War.” ch. 425, § 10,
30 Stat. 1121, 1151 (1899). The USACE continues to maintain navigable
waterways with the mission to, “provide safe, reliable, efficient, and
environmentally sustainable waterborne transportation systems for the movement
of commercial goods, for national security needs, and for recreation.” Inland
Marine Transportation System, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, https://
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  9 2/25/21  8:40 AM









   
    




   
  















      
 
   
       
      
  
   
 
    
  
52021] EXAMINING THE RECORD
continually interpreted by United States Supreme Court rulings.12 USACE 
recently updated its WOTUS regulation in September 2019.13 The legal
phrase currently includes traditional navigable waters, such as oceans,
rivers, lakes, and tributaries and wetlands adjoining those waters,
including some large lakes, ponds, and ditches.14 The new guidance also
clearly explains what are not WOTUS, and lists them as, “features that
only contain water during or in response to rainfall, groundwater; many
ditches, including most roadside or farm ditches; prior converted cropland;
storm water control features; and waste treatment systems.”15 
Considering these definitions and the stated purpose of the CWA, the
predominant view is that Section 313 limits “water” to surface water, or
navigable waters, and does include non-navigable waters, such as
groundwater.16 However, the minority view is that the drafters of the
statute could have used the word “navigable waters,” but did not, meaning 
that the statute waives sovereign immunity for all varieties of water
pollution, including groundwater. This minority view, however, cannot
survive scrutiny when read against the United States Supreme Court’s
narrow interpretation of waivers of sovereign immunity in various
environmental protection statutes, the historical context of the CWA, and
the CWA’s legislative history. Several Supreme Court rulings applying
the traditional methods of statutory construction show the Court would use
www.usace.army.mil/Missions/Civil-Works/Navigation/IMTS/ [https://perma
.cc/Y3AN-9TZH] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
12. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); see also United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
13. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-
Existing Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R.
pt. 328).
14. Navigable Waters Protection Rule Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/nwpr/navigable-waters-protection-rule-overview 
[https://perma.cc/ZJB7-YEQV] (last visited Jan. 7, 2021).
15. Id.
16. See Barry Breen, Federal Supremacy and Sovereign Immunity Waivers
in Federal Environmental Law, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,326, 10,328 (1985). Breen
states, “The statute does not define ‘water,’ though it does define ‘navigable 
waters,’ courts disagree over whether the regulatory provisions of the Act may be
extended to regulation of groundwater. The principal focus of the Act is certainly
surface water. Probably the better view is that the FWPCA waiver does not apply
‘clearly and unambiguously’ to groundwater, but this issue has apparently not
been directly tested in court.” Id.
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  10 2/25/21  8:40 AM












    
 
  
    
  
    
   









        
   
       
        








     
      
    
   
     
6 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
each of the above-mentioned factors to narrowly interpret Section 313 in
favor of the federal government.17 
II. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF WAIVERS OF SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY
A. Origins of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
Legal scholars reason the source of the modern doctrine of sovereign
immunity traces back to our nation’s English history.18 The English 
doctrine of sovereign immunity assumed the king could do no wrong
because he was the one who made the laws.19 Federalist 81 provides an
early discussion of the sovereign immunity doctrine in American
jurisprudence and essentially adopts the English rule.20 In Federalist 81,
Alexander Hamilton wrote, “It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not
to be amenable to the suit of an individual WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.”21 
He then continues, “Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity
in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger
intimated must be merely ideal.” 22 The doctrine was cemented in
American common law by 1907 when Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
wrote in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank that, “A sovereign is exempt from
suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”23 
As shown above, the concept of sovereign immunity has deep
historical roots that courts must consider when interpreting statutory
17. See FAA v. Cooper, 556 U.S. 284, 290 (2012); see also Hancock v. Train,
426 U.S. 176, 180 (1976).
18. See Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign
Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. R. 439, 443 (2005); see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 1.
19. Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. R. 1201,
1201 (2001). To the contrary, as shown by the aforementioned article, some legal
scholars reason the United States explicitly rejected the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and that the Supreme Court never should have read it into our law. They
argue the United States clearly chose not to have a king and to make the executive
subject to the legislative branch, and therefore find the doctrine of sovereign
immunity cannot logically exist in concert with Article I, Section 9 of the United
States Constitution, which states, “No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the
United States.” Id. at 1202; U.S. CONST. art I, § 9.
20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
21. Id. (emphasis in original).
22. Id.
23. 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  11 2/25/21  8:40 AM











    







   
   
 
   
  








    
   
    
  
 
   
    
 
    
  
  
    
72021] EXAMINING THE RECORD
waivers of sovereign immunity. Courts considering issues of statutory
construction typically consider the statute’s text, structure, drafting
history, and purpose.24 The Supreme Court has never considered the
application of the word “water” in the CWA’s waiver. However, it has
reviewed the waivers of sovereign immunity in the CWA and Clean Air
Act (“CAA”) for other reasons, specifically to determine whether the
states can impose certain permitting requirements on the federal
government.25 Prior to exploring the CWA and CAA cases, it is useful to
understand the general legal principles the Supreme Court uses when
interpreting the breadth of waivers of sovereign immunity in federal
statutes.
B. FAA v. Cooper: The Present State of the Sovereign Immunity 
Doctrine
FAA v. Cooper is a recent case that provides the rule for the Supreme
Court’s current approach to waivers of sovereign immunity in federal
statutes, which include the CWA and other environmental protection
laws.26 In Cooper, the Court considered a waiver of sovereign immunity
in the Privacy Act and applied its past precedent from a long line of cases.27 
In Cooper, Justice Alito wrote for the Court and held, “a waiver of
sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text,”
and “any ambiguities are to be construed in favor of immunity.”28 His 
ruling was based on a long history of well-settled law giving great
deference to the government on the issue of waiver of sovereign
immunity.29 
The Court reasoned that not even a favorable reading of legislative
history can achieve a ruling against immunity when Congress’ intent is not
clear from the plain language of the statute.30 In summary, the waiver must
24. FAA v. Cooper, 556 U.S. 284, 305 (2012).
25. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 168 (1976).
26. Cooper, 556 U.S. at 284. A review of Cooper’s Westlaw history indicates
it is the most recent and controlling Supreme Court case on the interpretation of
federal waivers of sovereign immunity.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 305 (citing Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996); Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685–86 (1983)).
29. Cooper, 556 U.S. at 290 (citing Lane, 518 U.S. at 192; United States v.
Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33, (1992); Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498
U.S. 89, 95 (1990)).
30. Cooper, 556 U.S. at 290 (citing Lane, 518 U.S. at 192).
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  12 2/25/21  8:40 AM














   
 
   
   
    
    
   
  
   
   




   
   
  
 
    
    
   
    
     
    
       
     
       
       
     
   
8 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
be clear from the plain text.31 Otherwise, when ambiguities exist, the Court
applies traditional statutory interpretation tools, but ultimately takes the 
interpretation most favorable to the government.32 
The traditional tools of statutory construction the Court cites are the
statute’s text, structure, drafting history, and purpose.33 Later sections of
this Article will take a close look at drafting history and purpose. First,
however, it is useful to review how the Court has ruled in two cases where
states attempted to enforce the permit requirements in the CAA and CWA
against the federal government.
C. EPA v. California State Water Resources Control Board
The Supreme Court decided Hancock v. Train and EPA v. California
ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board on the same day–June 7,
1976.34 Justice White wrote both opinions and reached the same legal
conclusion.35 The issue before the Court was whether states could require 
the federal government to obtain a permit from the states’ regulatory
agencies.36 The answer in both cases was no.37 Again, the cases considered
the same legal question and reached the same conclusion, but Hancock has
risen into prominence as the seminal case on the issue of sovereign
immunity in environmental protection statutes.38 
Consistent with Hancock, the Court in EPA v. California held that
federal activities are “subject to state regulation only when and to the
extent that congressional authorization is clear and unambiguous.”39 EPA 
v. California discusses the “requirements” language in the “control and
abatement” of water pollution clause of Section 313, but not the overall
scope of the waiver or the definition of the word “water.”40 Because
Hancock is the more frequently cited case on the present topic, this paper
will analyze Hancock rather than EPA v. California.
31. See Cooper, 556 U.S. at 290.
32. Id. at 291.
33. Id.
34. EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200
(1976); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 167 (1976). Hancock considered the
Clean Air Act and EPA v. California considered the Clean Water Act.
35. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200; Hancock, 426 U.S. at 167.
36. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 200.
37. Id. at 226; see also Hancock, 426 U.S. at 180.
38. See generally Breen, supra note 16, at 10,326.
39. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 210.
40. Id.
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  13 2/25/21  8:40 AM











    
   
    
 
  
   
  
   
   







    
  
 
    
   





        
      
   
   
   
92021] EXAMINING THE RECORD
D. Hancock v. Train
1. The Clean Air Act’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity 
Section 118 of the Clean Air Act of 1970 contains a waiver of
sovereign immunity stating, “[The Federal Government] shall . . . comply
with . . . Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements . . . respecting
the control and abatement of air pollution.”41 The Supreme Court
considered this waiver’s language in Hancock v. Train.42 In Hancock, 
Kentucky argued the language of the waiver required federal installations
emitting air pollution to obtain a permit from the state.43 The United States 
argued it did not need to obtain a permit from the state.44 Specifically, the
federal government’s position was that Section 118 required it to reduce
its harmful emissions, but that it did not need to obtain permits from the
state because the permitting requirement was not expressly included in the
CAA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.45 Kentucky argued the permits
were necessarily included because they were the manner in which the
CAA’s requirements were enforced.46 Kentucky was concerned that
without the permits, any attempt to enforce the CAA on federal
installations would be futile.47 
2. Narrow Interpretation
In Hancock, the Court narrowly interpreted the scope of the CAA’s 
waiver and held Section 118 did not require the federal government to
obtain permits from the state of Kentucky.48 The Court’s opinion was
grounded in precedent that Congress only waives sovereign immunity
when there is a clear expression or implication of its intent to be bound,
and otherwise the federal government must be left free of state
41. Clean Air Act § 118(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (2018).
42. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
43. Id. at 167 (1976). Permitting Under the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/caa-permitting [https://perma.cc
/7D4N-TK2F] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020) (The CAA uses permits to enforce the
goals of the Act. The CAA allowed the states to implement many of these permit
programs.).
44. See Hancock, 426 U.S. at 174; see also Breen, supra note 16, at 10,328.
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10 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
regulation.49 The Court noted that the federal government could only be
regulated by the state when there was “specific congressional action” that
makes the authorization of state regulation “clear and unambiguous.”50 
3. Application to the CWA
The holding in Hancock applies to the scope of the waiver of sovereign
immunity in the CWA. As discussed above, Hancock considered the scope
of the CAA’s waiver of sovereign immunity in terms of state regulation of
the federal government.51 While that specific issue is not the focus of this
paper, this case stands for the legal principle that courts will narrowly
interpret waivers of sovereign immunity in environmental statutes. Given
this precedent, an examination of the legislative history and historical
context of the CWA further clarifies that the scope of Section 313 is
limited to navigable waters.
III. SECTION 313 MUST BE VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ACT’S 
HISTORICAL PURPOSE
Congress appears to have recycled language from the CAA and used
it in the CWA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.52 The CWA’s language is
almost identical to the language used in the CAA two years earlier.53 
Therefore, to understand the scope of the waiver it is necessary to examine
the historical context in which Congress passed the CWA, its legislative
history, and its stated purpose.
A. Stated Purpose of the Act
The text of the CWA lists seven goals in its first paragraph.54 The very
first goal was to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters of the United States by 1985.55 Other goals include the protection 
49. Id. at 178–79. (citing United States. v. Wittek, 337 U.S. 346, 359 (1949);
Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445, (1943)).
50. Id at 179. (citing Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263, (1963)); 
California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. EPA, 511 F.2d 963, 968 (9th
Cir. 1975)).
51. Id.; see also Breen, supra note 16, at 10,328.
52. See S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 3776 (1972) (Conf. Rep.).
53. Clean Water Act §313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2018); Clean Air Act §
118(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (2018).
54. Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. 1251(a) (2018).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  15 2/25/21  8:40 AM





    
  










   
  
   
 
    
   
    
 





   
    
   
          
        
 
  
   
    
 
   
      
     
112021] EXAMINING THE RECORD
of fish, shellfish, wildlife, and to provide for recreation in and on the
water.56 A review of these enumerated goals makes clear Congress was
focused on protecting navigable waters when it drafted the CWA, and this
focus can logically flow to Congress’ intent for the scope of the CWA’s
waiver of sovereign immunity.
B. Historical Context
The legislative history of the CWA reflects the popular sentiment that
the nation was becoming increasingly concerned with the conditions of its
lakes and rivers in the late 1960s and early 1970s.57 Several highly visible
incidents of water pollution had made it into the national spotlight. A
review of materials from that era provides useful context to Congress’
passing of the CWA in 1972.
1. President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s Special Message to Congress, 
1965
President Lyndon Baines Johnson wrote a letter to Congress in 1965
titled, “Conservation and Restoration of Natural Beauty.”58 The letter
called for new national parks and recreation areas and, more directly
related to this paper, discussed the impact of air and water pollution on the
nation.59 The letter arguably summarized the mood of many Americans in
the late 1960s and set the stage for the passage of the CAA and the CWA.60 
President Johnson dedicated several sections of the letter to rivers in
general, an entire section on the Potomac River, and water pollution 
generally.61 Regarding water pollution, his letter stated, “Every major river
system is now polluted. Waterways that were once sources of pleasure and
beauty and recreation are forbidden to human contact and objectionable to
sight and smell. Furthermore, this pollution is costly, requiring expensive
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).
57. Letter from the National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, to
the President of the United States (Oct. 10, 1972) (on file with author; available
on HeinOnline). See also ROBERT W. ALDER, JESSICA C. LANDMAN, & DIANE M.
CAMERON, THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 7 (1st ed. 1993) (One author
cited to the river, lake, and coastline pollution of the early 1970s, and argued that,
“By 1972, the nation was ready for stronger medicine.”).
58. Special Message to the Congress on Conservation and Restoration of
Natural Beauty, 1965 PUB. PAPERS 155 (Feb. 8, 1965) [hereinafter Pres. Johnson
Message].
59. Id.
60. See The Cities: The Price of Optimism, TIME, Aug. 1, 1969, at 41.
61. Pres. Johnson Message, supra note 58.
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  16 2/25/21  8:40 AM








   





    
 
     
  
   
   
   
   
 
 
   
   
   
    
  
   





      
   
12 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
treatment for drinking water and inhibiting the operation and growth of
industry.”62 
The use of the terms “river system” and “waterways” illustrates the
categories of water President Johnson was concerned about.63 His letter 
focused on navigable waters and the need for laws the federal government
can enforce against private industry and manufacturing.64 The letter
certainly does not support the idea that Congress was focused on non-
navigable water and groundwater when it drafted the CWA several years
later. 
2. Cuyahoga River Fire
President Johnson’s concerns about water pollution in his 1965 letter
were illustrated by the situation in Cleveland, Ohio, several years later. In
1969, the Cuyahoga River caught fire in Cleveland, Ohio, and captured
national attention.65 Few photos can grab headlines like that of a river
through a major city literally on fire.66 On August 1, 1969, Time magazine 
published an article condemning the dismal state of the Cuyahoga River
and other rivers in rust-belt industrial cities.67 Time told America how





65. Lorraine Boissoneault, The Cuyahoga River Caught Fire at Least a
Dozen Times, but No One Cared Until 1969, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Jun. 19, 2019),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/cuyahoga-river-caught-fire-least-
dozen-times-no-one-cared-until-1969-180972444/ [https://perma.cc/PG8Z-
4K6D]; The Cities: The Price of Optimism, supra note 60, at 41.
66. Michael Rotman, Cuyahoga River Fire, CLEVELAND HIST. (Oct. 5, 2019),
https://clevelandhistorical.org/items/show/63 [https://perma.cc/UV9Q-3HZ6]
(The photo published by Time magazine was actually from a fire on the river in
1952. Nonetheless, the Time article focused public attention on the 1969 fire
despite incorrectly citing the date of the photo.).
67. The Cities: The Price of Optimism, supra note 60, at 41.
68. Id.
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132021] EXAMINING THE RECORD
The Cuyuhoga River on fire and engulfing a bridge in 1948. Boissoneault, supra
note 65.
Oil almost completely covered the Cuyahoga River in 1969, and it
burst into flames, destroying two bridges and causing at least $100,000 in
damage.69 The Cuyahoga River had become so polluted that one local said,
“there was a general rule that if you fell in, [G]od forbid, you would go
immediately to the hospital.”70 
News of the fire quickly extended beyond Time magazine, and
National Geographic featured it as the cover story in its December 1970
issue.71 The National Geographic's cover read, “Our Ecological Crisis.”72 
In addition to these popular magazine articles, a recent Senate resolution
celebrating fifty years of progress in the Cuyahoga River recalled the oil-
laden state of the waterway, and its nickname “the burning river,” because
of the thirteen total times the river caught fire.73 
69. Rotman, supra note 66.
70. Boissoneault, supra note 65; The Cities: The Price of Optimism, supra
note 60, at 41.
71. Boissoneault, supra note 65; The Cities: The Price of Optimism, supra
note 60, at 41; Gordon Young, Pollution: Threat to Man’s Only Home, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC, Dec. 1970, at 738.
72. Id. at 737 (The article argues the nation had not made enough progress
towards cleaning its waters, and cites to a quote from the December 1897 issue of
the National Geographic, which reads, “Until state or national legislation can be
secured to regulate such matters, the Potomac . . . must serve as a sort of sewer
into which towns and manufacturing establishments empty their refuse.”).
73. S. Res. 290, 116th Cong. (2019) (enacted).
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14 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
The 1969 fire did not burn very long, but it enjoyed notoriety in the
national media as illustrated by the Time and National Geographic
articles.74 The national interest in this story helps suggest that both the
public and Congress were focused on navigable waters, such as the
Cuyahoga River, when it passed the Clean Water Act three years later in
1972.
3. Great Lakes Contamination
In addition to the Cuyahoga River fires, another Time magazine article 
from May 1970 titled, Endangered Great Lakes, focused attention on the
dangerous levels of mercury dumped into the Great Lakes by United States
and Canadian industries.75 The mercury contamination had become so bad
in April 1970 that officials banned all fishing on Lake Saint Clair—a large 
lake located between Lake Huron and Lake Erie—because mercury levels
were fourteen times the maximum amount safe for human consumption.76 
The issue had become so dire that the Secretary of the Interior ordered a
federal investigation of all legal substances discharged into the Great
Lakes.77 By the 1970s, Lake Erie had become so polluted that it “oozed
rather than flowed.”78 Lake Erie had fallen victim to massive dumping and 
pollution from Cleveland, Toledo, and the other major industrial cities on
its shores.79 
As with the river fire in Cleveland, another widely-read Time
magazine article drew attention to the issue of pollution in the nation’s
navigable waters.80 A review of these articles and other historical
publications supports the argument that Congress’ attention when drafting
74. Boissoneault, supra note 65.
75. Endangered Great Lakes, TIME, May 4, 1970, at 85.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Mary Griggs, 1970s Redux: Lake Erie Is So Polluted, Toledo’s Drinking 
Water Was Cut Off, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.smith
sonianmag.com/smart-news/toledos-water-supply-was-contaminated-toxins-algae-
180952242/ [https://perma.cc/V6L6-NDEG].
79. See Endangered Great Lakes, supra note 75, at 85; R. DANA ONO, JAMES 
D. WILLIAMS, & ANNE WAGNER, VANISHING FISHES OF NORTH AMERICA 27 
(1983) (The damage to the Great Lakes continued to persist after Congress passed
the CWA in 1972. The author writes, “While the Great Lakes have an impressive
capability of absorbing the punishing onslaught of Man’s activities, the 
overutilization of the lakes’ resources has grown at astronomical rates, further
testing the lakes’ ability to recover.”).
80. Endangered Great Lakes, supra note 75, at 85.
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152021] EXAMINING THE RECORD
the CWA was focused on protecting navigable waters, and waived its
sovereign immunity accordingly.
C. Legislative History
1. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
The Rivers and Harbors Act (“RHA”) of 1899, officially the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act, was the original predecessor to the CWA
of 1972. The RHA was an appropriation bill that set rules for the use of
navigable waters in addition to funding many waterway construction
projects.81 Section 13 of the RHA set the stage for the CWA that came
over seventy years later. Specifically, Section 13 states,
That it shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause,
suffer, or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either
from or out of any ship . . . any refuse matter of any kind or
description whatever other than that flowing from streets or
sewers and passing therefrom into any navigable water of the
United States.82 
Interestingly, Section 13 of the RHA contains a waiver of sovereign
immunity for the military, stating, “[t]hat the Secretary of War, whenever
in the judgment of the Chief of Engineers anchorage and navigation will
not be injured thereby, may permit the deposit of any material above 
mentioned into navigable waters.”83 
In addition to Section 13, Sections 9 and 10 of the RHA prohibited
any obstructions placed in navigable waters.84 The focus of the RHA, 
including its waiver of sovereign immunity, was on navigable waters.85 
There is no reason to believe Congress intended the scope of its successor
statute or its waiver of sovereign immunity to be anything different.
2. President’s Nixon’s 1970 Statement to Congress on Water 
Pollution
On April 15, 1970, President Nixon wrote a message to Congress
urging legislation to combat the disposal of waste in the Great Lakes and
81. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (1899).
82. Id.
83. Rivers and Harbors Act § 13 (emphasis added).
84. Rivers and Harbors Act §§ 9, 10, 13.
85. See id.
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16 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
oceans.86 President Nixon referred the letter to the House Committee on
Public Works for its consideration.87 The President began the letter with
an emotional call for action,
The first of the Great Lakes to be discovered by the seventeenth
century French explorers was Lake Huron. So amazed were these
brave men by the extent and beauty of that lake, they named it
“The Sweet Sea.” Today there are enormous sections of the Great
Lakes (including almost all of Lake Erie) that make such a title
ironic. The by-products of modern technology and large
population increases have polluted the lakes to a degree
inconceivable to the world of the seventeenth century explorers.88 
President Nixon’s letter outlined a proposed bill to Congress that closely
resembled what would later become the CWA.89 The scope of President
Nixon’s proposed bill focused on dumping waste in the Great Lakes and
oceans.90 Interestingly, the language President Nixon used in the letter
could easily be pulled from a 2020 presidential debate. He states, “we are 
only beginning to realize the ecological effects of ocean dumping and
current technology is not adequate to handle wastes of a volume now being
produced.”91 The letter never mentions groundwater or any other non-
navigable water.92 In total, it can be inferred from this letter that the chief
executive never intended the primary purpose of a new clean water bill,
including its waiver of sovereign immunity, to include non-navigable
waters.
3. Senate Public Works Committee Report, October 28, 1971
Congress appears to have been paying attention to navigable water
pollution in 1971 because it was already working to pass the CWA. The
Senate Public Works Committee published a report on proposed CWA
legislation on October 28, 1971.93 Section 313 received little discussion in 
86. H.R. DOC. NO. 91-308 (1970) (This letter is included in the Legislative 
History section rather than the Historical Context section because President Nixon







93. S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668.
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172021] EXAMINING THE RECORD
the report.94 The report recognizes the federal government as a major
contributor to water pollution and states, “The Federal Government cannot
expect private industry to abate pollution if the Federal Government
continues to pollute. This section requires that Federal facilities meet all
control requirements as if they were private citizens.”95 
The report does not discuss the scope of the waiver in terms of
different types of waters.96 The reference to “private citizens” would be
more meaningful if the scope of the CWA extended to non-navigable
water, but it does not, as made clear by the language of the bill and its
historical context.
4. House and Senate Conference Committee, September 28, 1972
The United States House of Representatives and Senate often pass
versions of the same bill with different language.97 When this happens, the
House and Senate will form a conference committee to reconcile
differences in each chamber’s legislation.98 Congress used this process to
pass the Clean Water Act of 1972.99 
The Senate and House of Representatives issued a conference
committee report on September 28, 1972.100 The purpose of the committee
was to identify and reconcile differences between House and Senate
versions of the CWA.101 The conference report simply states, “[Section
313] is the same as the Senate bill and the House amendment.”102 As with
the original Senate report, there is no debate or discussion on the scope of
the waiver, nor any indication that the original drafters would mean
“water” to mean anything other than “navigable water.”103 
Notably, the scope of both the House and the Senate’s declaration of
policy goals is the same.104 Both chambers used the phrase “United States
94. Id. at 3733–34.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Conference Committee, DISTRICT POL’Y GROUP, http://www.district
policygroup.com/dewonkify-detail/conference-committee 
[https://perma.cc/594S-UXQ2] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
98. Id.
99. S. REP. NO. 92-1236 (1972) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776.
100. Id. at 3776.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 3813.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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18 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
waters” when setting their goals.105 United States waters, or Waters of the 
United States is a phrase with much legal significance.106 The term
“Waters of the United States” was a new phrase first found in the Clean 
Water Act of 1972 and was not defined by the EPA until May 1973.107 
Interestingly, the legislative history makes clear Congress chose to use
“Waters of the United States” rather than list the actual scope of the Act.108 
However, neither chamber discusses groundwater or non-navigable water
when setting their expressed policy goals in 1972, allowing for the
argument that the intended scope of their proposed waiver was the same.109 
5. Senate Consideration of the Report of the Conference Committee, 
October 4, 1972
The Senate held a hearing on October 4, 1972, to consider the CWA’s
conference committee report.110 The transcript of the debate provides an 
excellent understanding of the legislative intent of the CWA. Senator
Edmund Muskie submitted the conference report to the Senate at the
hearing.111 Senator Muskie was an environmentalist and helped pass both 
the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.112 Senator Muskie began the
hearing by framing water pollution in terms of navigable waters, stating,
Our planet is beset with a cancer which threatens our very
existence and which will not respond to the kind of treatment it
has been prescribed in the past. The cancer of water pollution was
engendered by our abuse of lakes, streams, rivers and oceans; it
has thrived on our half-hearted attempts to control it, and like any
other disease, it can kill us.113 
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. STEPHEN MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44585, EVOLUTION OF
THE MEANING OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT
6 (2019).
108. Id. (As early as 1899, Congress appears to have preferred to take a 
flexible approach to defining navigable waters because it allowed the United
States Army’s engineers to set the definition by regulation, rather than defining it
by statute.) See Clean Water Act § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2018).
109. S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 3813.
110. 118 CONG. REC. 33,692 (1972).
111. Id.
112. Edmund Muskie, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/
Edmund-Muskie [https://perma.cc/JBD9-BEXZ] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
113. 118 CONG. REC. 33,692 (1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
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192021] EXAMINING THE RECORD
Senator Muskie continues to discuss pollution of lakes, rivers, bays, and
oceans.114 The hearing discusses the Act in detail but never discusses any 
intent for water pollution to mean anything other than the term “navigable 
waters” discussed throughout the CWA.115 
6. Executive Order 12088
In 1978, President Jimmy Carter issued an executive order that
attempted to broaden the waivers of sovereign immunity in the CWA and
other environmental protection statutes.116 The executive order requires
the federal government to comply with all pollution control standards,
meaning the same substantive and procedural requirements that would
apply to any private person.117 
An executive order alone, however, cannot waive sovereign
immunity.118 Rather, Congress must pass legislation to accomplish this 
goal.119 The executive order appears to expand sovereign immunity on its
face, but it is best viewed as policy guidance to the executive branch to
ensure good faith compliance with environmental protection statutes.120 
D. Legislative History of Section 313 After 1972
Section I of this Article discusses the “current” version of the CWA to
foreshadow the fact Congress has made changes to the law over time.
Section 313 of the CWA has been amended twice since 1972. The 1972
version of Section 313 does not contain the word “water” when referring
to pollution.121 It simply says “pollution.”122 The word “water” was added 
in the 1977 amendments to the CWA when the entire sentence was re-
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Exec. Order No. 12,088, 3 C.F.R. 243–46 (1979).
117. Id.
118. Breen, supra note 16, at 10,331.
119. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976). Federalist 81 provides an
early presentation of the rules for sovereign immunity in American jurisprudence.
Alexander Hamilton reasoned a state could only be subject to suit if the state's
convention legislatively waived its sovereign immunity. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81
(Alexander Hamilton).
120. Breen, supra note 16, at 10,332. 
121. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92-500, § 313, 86 Stat. 816, 875 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1323
(2018)).
122. Id.
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20 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
written.123 The sentence was re-written to make the federal government
liable to the same extent as any non-government entity for any state
procedural requirements and sanctions, to include recordkeeping and
reports.124 
The House and Senate again used the conference committee process 
when they amended the CWA in 1977. In the 1977 conference report, the
Senate amendment states, “This section clarifies [S]ection 313 of the Act
to provide that all Federal facilities must comply with all substantive and
procedural requirements of Federal, State, or local water pollution control
laws.”125 This was likely a response to the ambiguity addressed in the 
Hancock and EPA v. California cases. The 1977 conference report makes
no indication that adding the word “water” was an intentional substantive
change to the scope of the 1972 law.126 It also does not discuss any changes
to the scope of the waiver in terms of the types of waters it applies to.127 
CONCLUSION
The CWA’s legislative history, the historical events of the late 1960s
and early 1970s, and Supreme Court precedent make clear the Act’s
waiver of sovereign immunity is limited to navigable waters. The scope of
the CWA itself is limited to navigable waters and there is no indication
that Congress intended the scope of the waiver to extend beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Act itself. Plaintiffs have never directly challenged the
scope of the waiver and the meaning of the word “water” in the current
version of Section 313 before the Supreme Court. Such a challenge could
focus on the issue of groundwater pollution around current and former
military bases. However, if a plaintiff were to attempt to extend the scope
of the waiver beyond the traditional jurisdiction of the CWA, then there is
a strong argument the Court would rule in favor of the government and
find the waiver in Section 313 is limited to navigable waters.
123. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, §61, 91 Stat. 1566, 1598
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (2018)).
124. Id.
125. H.R. REP. NO. 95-830 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4424, 4466.
126. Id.
127. Id.
